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1.  Introduction 
It may well be that the Gazprom antitrust case1 
launched by DG Competition on September 4th 
will turn out to be the landmark antitrust case of 
this decade, as Microsoft2 was of the last decade. 
The argument of this paper is that, for a host of 
political and economic reasons, this case is likely 
to  be  hard  fought  by  both  sides  to  a  final 
prohibition decision and then onwards into the 
EU  courts.  In  the  process,  the  European  gas 
market and the powers of DG Competition in the 
energy field are likely to be transformed.3  
                                                   
1  “Commission  Opens  Proceedings  against 
Gazprom”,  4  September  2012,  Commission  Press 
Release, IP/12/937. 
2  The  Microsoft  case  law  consists  of  the  original 
prohibition decision including a fine of €497 million 
and a series of compliance orders in March 2004 (Case 
COMP/C-3/37.792,  Microsoft),  fixing  penalty 
payments for non-compliance in July 2006 (involving 
an  additional  fine  of  €280.5  million)  and  February 
2008 (involving a further fine of €899 million), as well 
as  judgment  in  favour  of  the  Commission  in 
September  2007,  Case  T-201/04  Microsoft  v. 
Commission.  The  final  judgment  (again  in  favour  of 
the Commission) with respect to the non-compliance 
cases was handed down in the summer of 2012, Case 
T-167/08 Microsoft v. Commission.  
3  The  author  suspects  that  given  the  potential 
resistance  from  Gazprom  to  comply  with  EU  law 
even  on  the  territory  of  the  member  states,  DG 
Competition will need to fully explore the potential of 
 
In  an  ordinary  energy  antitrust  case,  the  most 
likely option would be a quiet private settlement 
by  an  Article  9  ‘commitment  decision’.4  That 
option is much less likely to be a realistic one in 
this  case.  The  political  and  economic 
circumstances  of  this  case  are  exceptional. 
Gazprom  is  under  a  substantial  degree  of 
structural  and  market  pressure;  its  potential 
antitrust  liability  is  significant  and  DG 
Competition is determined to ensure a genuine 
open single market in gas. It is open to question 
as  to  how  far  the  Gazprom  board  and  the 
Kremlin would ever be prepared to sufficiently 
compromise with the Commission in order for a 
Commitment Decision to be agreed. 
 
                                                                                     
the  Union’s  antitrust  case  law  and  legislation  with 
respect to enforcement.  
4  Commitment  decisions  can  be  taken  in  antitrust 
cases  where  an  investigated  party  is  willing  to 
cooperate  with  the  Commission.  Decisions  are 
adopted  under  Art.  9  of  Regulation  1/2003  (the 
Union’s core procedural regulation). For a discussion 
of  the  law  on  commitments,  see  H.  Schweitzer, 
“Commitment Decisions in the EU and in the Member 
States:  Functions  and  Risks  of  New  Instruments  of 
Competition  Law  Enforcement  within  a  Federal 
Enforcement  Regime”,  E-Competitions  Bulletin,  2 
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The case therefore may well be subject to a full 
European  antitrust  process;  a  prohibition 
decision  with  fines  attached,  a  series  of  legal 
challenges by Gazprom to the EU General Court 
and  onward  to  the  European  Court  of  Justice. 
Given the political resistance already evident in 
Moscow  in  the  preliminary  blocking  statute,5 
there is also the potential for a series of parallel 
Commission  non-compliance  cases  as  in 
Microsoft.6 There are also grounds for believing 
that  the  Gazprom  case  may  well  generate 
interest  in  the  Central  and  Eastern  European 
Baltic states7 in deploying their own regulatory 
and  civil  law  procedures  against  Gazprom. 
These  national  processes  would  be  engaged 
against Gazprom in respect of antitrust liabilities 
incurred  under  national  law  prior  to  their 
accession to the European Union.8 
The potential landmark nature of the case flows 
first  from  the  mixture  of  core  antitrust  issues, 
from  illegal  resale  clauses  to  abusive  denial  of 
third  party  access  to  exploitative  pricing, 
combined  with  a  host  of  structural  supply 
security and geostrategic questions. Secondly, its 
importance  derives  from  the  prospect  that  the 
case may lead to the dismantling of the Gazprom 
model  as  a  network  of  long-term  supply 
contracts  linked  to  oil  arranged  with  vertically 
integrated  domestic  energy  incumbents  and  its 
                                                   
5  “Kremlin  shields  Gazprom  from  EU  probe”, 
Financial Times, 11 September 2012. 
6 And potentially the prospect of significant penalties 
as in the Microsoft case for non-compliance. 
7  Hereafter  when  referring  to  Central  and  Eastern 
Europe, the Baltic states are included within the term. 
8  The  Commission  case  only  deals  with  antitrust 
liabilities from the 1st May 2004 when eight Central 
and  Eastern  European  States  entered  the  Union. 
However,  as  a  result  of  the  Europe  Agreements 
signed in the early and mid-1990s the then Candidate 
Member  States  were  required  to  adopt  homologue 
competition  law  provisions  into  their  national  legal 
orders.  Hence  if  there  were  continuing  antitrust 
offences  committed  by  Gazprom  at  the  time  of  the 
launch  of  the  Commission’s  investigation,  national 
authorities could seek to investigate the period prior 
to  1  May  2004  in  parallel  with  the  Commission’s 
investigation. However, what is not possible is for the 
Commission to investigate alleged antitrust offences 
prior  to  1  May  2004.  See  Case  C-17/10  Toshiba 
Corporation and others v. Úřad pro Ochranu Hospodářské 
Soutěže, ECJ 14 February 2012, nyr. 
final  replacement  with  a  single  interconnected 
European  gas  market  relying  on  gas  to  gas 
competition in a number of hubs. 
The  Kremlin  should  really  be  deploying  the 
antitrust  case  to  force  Gazprom  to  reform. 
Because  of  increased  global  gas  liquidity,  the 
economic  crisis  and  consequent  lack  of 
affordability of the EU’s climate change strategy, 
the size of the European gas market will enlarge 
over  the  next  decade.  Russian  gas  companies 
could have a major role in an enlarged European 
market. However, to prosper in such an enlarged 
European gas market, the Russian market must 
itself be liberalised.  
As  the  case  proceeds,  it  may  well  be  that  the 
modernisers in the Kremlin administration may 
obtain the upper hand and will be able to seek a 
settlement with the Commission. If they do not, 
then  there  is  likely  to  be  a  major  prohibition 
decision resetting their terms of business in the 
European  Union,  a  host  of  ancillary  litigation 
and  at  the  end  a  very  different  European  gas 
market  from  the  one  in  which  Gazprom 
currently operates. 
This  paper  is  divided  into  six  sections.  The 
second  section  looks  at  Gazprom’s  current 
market  and  structural  vulnerability  in  the 
context of the shale gas revolution; section 3 puts 
the  case  in  the  context  of  the  European 
Commission’s  programme  for  the  creation  of  a 
single  market  in  gas,  energy  liberalisation  and 
the  maintenance  of  free  competition  across  the 
Union. Section 4 examines the allegations made 
against Gazprom by the Commission and their 
implications. The 5th section considers the initial 
Russian  reaction.  And,  in  conclusion,  the  final 
section  offers  some  proposals  for  the  Russian 
government to reform its gas market, which may 
also then provide a basis for settlement with the 
Commission. The conclusion also considers the 
implications  for  EU-Russian  relations  should 
there be no settlement. 
2.  Shale gas and the market 
vulnerability of Gazprom 
2.1  The power of Gazprom? 
The  received  view  of  Gazprom  across  the 
continent  and  beyond  is  as  both  an  extremely 
commercially and politically powerful company. 
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Europe States, its role as a key supplier of energy 
to Germany,9 Turkey10 and Italy11 reinforce that 
view  of  its  commanding  role  on  European  gas 
markets.  That  commercial  power  has  been 
matched by the exercise of political power: The 
study by Larsson of politically motivated cut-offs 
in the Central and East European states between 
1991  and  200412  demonstrates  that  the 
overwhelming  majority  of  those  cut-offs  were 
gas related. More recently, the European Union 
has been affected by political disputes between 
Gazprom  and  the  Ukrainian  authorities,  which 
have resulted in cut-offs and reduced gas flows 
to the Union in 200613 and 2009.14 
This  economic  and  political  power  is 
underpinned by a network of long-term supply 
contracts  with  vertically  integrated  national 
energy  incumbents.  These  long-term  contracts 
include  take  and  pay  clauses  and,  allegedly, 
resale prohibition clauses. The contracts are not 
only for very long terms, often over 15 years, but 
also  for  the  overwhelming  majority  of  the 
customers’ requirements, in some cases as much 
as 100%. In addition, for most customers across 
the  Central  and  Eastern  European  states,  there 
are no alternative or only limited sources of gas 
to  Gazprom  supplies.  Almost  all  pipelines  run 
from  East  to  West,  as  they  were  designed  by 
Soviet planners, with little interconnection at all, 
until  recently,  between  states  across  the  region 
and  with  Western  Europe.  Gazprom  and  its 
allies  have  also  sought  to  acquire  downstream 
assets,  which  has  had  the  effect  of  further 
underpinning their market power.15 
                                                   
9 Reuters, “Russian Gas Exports to Europe up 8% in 
2011” (Germany 34bcm). 
 10 Ibid. (25bcm). 
11 Ibid. (17bcm).  
12  R.L.  Larsson,  Russia’s  Energy  Policy  Security 
Dimensions  and  Russia’s  Reliability  as  an  Energy 
Supplier,  Swedish  Defence  Research  Agency  (FOI), 
Stockholm, 2006.  
13 J. Stern, The Russian-Ukrainian Gas Crisis of January 
2006,  Oxford  Institute  for  Energy  Studies  (OIES), 
Oxford, 2006. 
14  J.  Stern,  S.  Pirani  and  K.  Yafimava,  The  Russo-
Ukrainian Gas Dispute of January 2009: A Comprehensive 
Assessment,  Oxford  Institute  for  Energy  Studies 
(OIES), Oxford, 2009. 
15  K.C.  Smith,  A  New  Stealth  Imperialism:  Russian 
Energy Politics in the Baltics, Poland and Ukraine, CSIS, 
2.2  The impact of the shale gas 
revolution on the global LNG 
market 
It  is  now  however  very  seriously  open  to 
question how far Gazprom will be able to sustain 
its  commercial  and  political  power.    The 
principal  immediate  threat  to  Gazprom  is  the 
impact  of  the  shale  gas  revolution.  This  threat 
does not stem directly from shale gas production 
in Europe but rather from the impact of shale gas 
on the global LNG market. The initial damage to 
Gazprom  from  shale  gas  emanated  from  the 
‘shutout’  effect  of  US  shale  gas  production. 
Essentially,  shale  gas  production  undermined 
the market for LNG in American markets and, as 
a consequence, led to the dumping of LNG on 
European  spot  markets.  Gazprom  had  to  offer 
significant price discounts in 2010 to a number of 
key customers in order to reduce its losses.16  
The  impact  of  LNG  dumping  was  blunted  on 
European  markets  due  to  market  liquidity 
draining  away  as  a  result  of  the  Fukushima 
disaster,  as  Japanese  demand  for  natural  gas 
leapt after as the nuclear power station fleet was 
switched off. However, the trend toward greater 
access  LNG  resources  for  Europe  is  still  clear. 
The growth in LNG production from shale and 
non-shale  gas  resources  worldwide  is  growing 
rapidly with more production on its way from 
Australia,  Canada  and  Qatar17.  Australia  may 
well  replace  Qatar  as  the  world’s  largest  LNG 
producer. Worse still for Gazprom it is open to 
question how much LNG China will need as the 
decade progresses. The current Chinese five year 
plan  provides  for  6.5bcm  by  2015  and 
ambitiously  seeks  to  produce  60  to  100bcm  by 
2020.18 There is a real danger for LNG producers 
that  the  US  experience  of  continental  wide 
‘shutout’  could  be  repeated  in  China  and 
elsewhere  as  shale  gas  production  gets 
underway at scale across the globe. 
                                                                                     
Center  for  Strategic  and  International  Studies, 
Washington, D.C., 2004, and Larsson, op. cit. 
16  Reuters,  “Gazprom  adjusts  gas  pricing  to  defend 
market share”, February 2010. 
17 BP Energy Outlook 2030, London, January 2012. The 
Outlook projects growth at 4.5% annually to 2030. 
18  “China  sets  Target  for  Shale  Gas  Development”, 
Financial Times, 16 March 2012. 4 | ALAN RILEY 
 
2.3   Shale gas liquidity leading to coal 
dumping in Europe 
Gazprom and all other gas suppliers are already 
faced  with  a  knock-on  effect  of  the  shale  gas 
revolution; coal displaced in US markets is now 
finding its way into Europe.19 With low US gas 
prices  coal  which  as  recently  as  2005  made  up 
50%  of  US  power  generation,  is  now  hovering 
just  above  30%20  (which  in  large  part  explains 
why  the  US  is  cutting  its  CO2  emissions  more 
rapidly than Europe).21 This has pushed the price 
of  US  coal  down  and  into  exports.  One  of  the 
strategic  threats  for  Gazprom  (and  other  gas 
supply companies) is that US-style ‘shutouts’ are 
repeated  round  the  world  as  shale  gas 
production  takes  off  and  Europe  becomes  a 
dumping ground for cheap coal.  
2.4  Potential for shale gas to be 
exported as LNG from the US 
In addition, to the prospect of ‘shutout’ for LNG 
producers from domestic shale gas production, 
there  is  also  the  prospect  of  shale  gas  being 
exported  as  LNG.  For  Gazprom,  the  greatest 
danger would be significant exports of US shale 
gas into the European market. The difficulty here 
for  Gazprom  is  that  there  is  a  compelling 
commercial  incentive  for  US  shale  gas  to  be 
exported  as  LNG.22  Although  some  sections  of 
                                                   
19 The first quarter of 2012 alone saw a 49% increase in 
US  coal  exports  to  the  European  Union  (see 
http://www.eia.gov/coal/production/quarterly/pd
f/t9p01p1.pdf). 
20  R.  Martin,  “In  Europe,  Coal  Regains  its  Crown”, 
Forbes, July 2012. 
21  International  Energy  Agency,  “Global  Carbon 
Dioxide Emissions Increase by 1.0Gt in 2011 to Record 
High”,  May  2012 
(www.iea.org/newsroomandevents/news/2012/may/name,2
7216,en.html). 
22 It could be argued that US LNG will largely go to 
Asia  given  current  Asian  demand.  However,  when 
one  takes  account  of  a)  Chinese  projections  of 
domestic shale gas production, b) Chinese domestic 
pipeline  and  gasification  capacity,  c)  Australian, 
Canadian and Qatari liquefaction capacity and d) the 
potential of East African offshore gas resources, it is 
difficult  to  see  how,  even  with  the  increase  in  the 
capacity of the Panama Canal from 2014, there can be 
a  major Eastern  Seaboard-Asia  LNG  trade  from  the 
proposed Eastern Seaboard liquefaction plants. There 
US  industry  have  called  for  an  export  ban  of 
shale gas in order to maintain low US gas prices, 
the overwhelming economic logic is for shale gas 
to  be  exported  as  LNG.  The  response  to  those 
seeking  to  maintain  a  ban  on  exports  is  that 
current  US  gas  prices  at  $3.20  MMBTU 
(European prices range $10-14 MMBTU) are too 
low for many even cost-conscious US producers 
to  maintain  production.  If  US  industry  wants 
stable long-term gas prices, prices have to rise to 
still world competitive levels of $4 to $5 MMBTU 
to maintain production. As a consequence, there 
is  a  very  compelling  case  to  encourage  a 
significant degree of shale gas export as LNG in 
order  to  provide  greater  profitability  to  US 
producers. In addition, such exports would add 
to  US  federal  and  local  tax  revenues  and 
generate greater incomes for holders of the sub-
soil rights.23  
2.5  The impact of further offshore 
resources in or near Europe 
What also has to be factored into the calculations 
of  supply  liquidity  are  the  prospects  for  the 
enormous  East  African  and  Eastern 
Mediterranean offshore gas resources, which are 
in  the  process  of  being  developed.24  Nearer  to 
home  there  is  also  the  prospect  of  developing 
shale  gas  offshore  in  the  North  Sea.25  It  is 
possible  that  for  instance  in  the  case  of  the 
                                                                                     
is in fact a good case for the alternative scenario of an 
over-supplied Asian market  providing LNG  via  the 
Panama Canal into Europe. 
23 15 natural gas export licence applications are being 
considered by the US Department of Energy. Of those 
15, only one has been cleared so far, the Sabine Pass 
project  run  by  Cheniere  Energy.  However,  it  is 
expected  that  after  the  Presidential  election,  these 
export licence applications will be considered by the 
new administration.   
24  For  East  Africa,  see  R.  Sorkhabi,  “East  African 
Margin  &  SW  Indian  Ocean  Basins  Project  Report 
2011-2012”,  Energy  and  Geoscience  Institute  (EGI), 
University  of  Utah,  2012.  For  an  overview  of  the 
prospects  and  difficulties  of  developing  the  Eastern 
Mediterranean resources see, D. Natali, “The Eastern 
Mediterranean  Basin:  A  New  Energy  Corridor”, 
Institute  for  National  Strategic  Studies  (INSS), 
National Defense  University,  Washington, D.C,  July 
2012.  
25 Reuters, “UK has vast shale gas reserves geologists 
say”, April 2012. COMMISSION V. GAZPROM: THE ANTITRUST CLASH OF THE DECADE? | 5 
 
African offshore developments that capital may 
switch  from  some  of  the  more  expensive 
proposed Australian  gas  field  developments  to 
cheaper East African offshore prospects. The net 
effect of these discoveries will still be greater gas 
liquidity as the decade proceeds.26 
2.6  The trend towards greater gas 
liquidity 
Therefore, even without a single shale gas well in 
Europe  coming  into  commercial  production, 
Gazprom  faces  a  significant  impact  from  shale 
gas.  There  may  well  be  instances  of  supplies 
scarcity,  as  after  Fukushima,  but  the  trend 
towards greater supply liquidity is clear. What 
also cannot be discounted is significant shale gas 
development in Europe itself. It would only take 
one  major  member  state  to  develop  shale  gas 
commercially and reap the ‘on-shoring effect’ of 
energy-intensive  manufacturing  to  trigger 
reconsideration  of  the  value  of  shale  gas 
production in many European capitals.27 
Much greater global gas liquidity coupled with 
access  to  varied  sources  of  gas  supply  –  LNG, 
shale gas as LNG and eventually European shale 
gas  –  puts  Gazprom’s  market  model  under 
immense pressure. LNG fuels the European spot 
market  price  which  creates  both  an  alternative 
                                                   
26 There is a similar issue with regard to deep water 
Caspian  gas.  One  question  hovering  over  the 
Southern  Corridor  is  whether  gas  from  the  deep 
water Caspian will be economic to develop in a more 
liquid  European  market.  It  may  well  be  that  if  the 
Southern Corridor is developed, then the gas may be 
sourced  in  greater  quantities  from  Iraq  than  from 
deep water Caspian. 
27 What is often overlooked in the debate on shale in 
Europe  is  the  immense  multiplier  effect  on  the  US 
economy from shale gas development. It is not just 
access to lower fuel prices for consumers. It is also a 
major  stimulus  to  energy-intensive  manufacturing 
leading  to  a  rebuilding  of  US  manufacturing 
competitiveness. If one major member state were to 
develop  shale  gas  with  some  determination  and  at 
scale, that state would gain a significant competitive 
advantage over the other member states. It is likely 
that  in  such  circumstances  that  a  number  of  states 
would reconsider their position with regard to shale 
gas development. For an assessment of the impact of 
shale gas on the US economy, see IHS Global Insight, 
The Economic and Employment Contributions of Shale Gas 
in the United States, Washington, D.C., 2011. 
source  of  supply  and  an  alternative  pricing 
model for European gas. EU third-party access 
rules allow energy-intensive users access to the 
spot market, and as more gasification terminals 
come on stream, many more customers will seek 
cheaper spot market price gas.28  
Gas  market  liquidity  and  diversity  therefore 
pose  an  existential  threat  to  the  traditional 
Gazprom  model  of  a  network  of  long-term 
supply  contracts  with  domestic  dominant 
incumbent.  Those  contracts,  with  their  resale 
prohibitions;  take-and-pay  clauses  and  price 
indexation to the oil price, and usually for most 
of a customer’s supply over a long time period 
(more than 15 years) are already under pressure 
from these new market developments.  
3.  The Gazprom investigation in the 
context of antitrust 
It  is  difficult  to  allege  that  DG  Competition  is 
somehow  unfairly  focusing  its  attention  on 
Gazprom. The Gazprom investigation is part of a 
much  larger  programme  initiated  in  the  late 
1990s  to  bring  about  a  fully  functioning  and 
operational  single  market  in  gas.  This 
programme  includes  the  first,29  second30  and 
third31 energy packages and the Sectoral Inquiry 
into the electricity and gas markets launched in 
                                                   
28 There are currently 20 LNG gasification terminals in 
operation  in  Europe  of  which  six  are  undergoing 
expansion of gasification capacity. Foreign investment 
decisions have been taken on a further six and they 
are now in the process of construction. A further 32 
LNG gasification plants are being considered across 
the continent. Even by 2015, it is estimated that there 
will  be  259bcm  of  gasification  capacity  across  the 
European  Union.  For  further  information,  see  Gas 
Infrastructure Europe (www.gie.eu). 
29  Directive  98/30/EC  of  the  European  Parliament 
and of the Council concerning the Common Rules for 
the Internal Market in Natural Gas, OJ 1998 L204/1. 
30  Directive  03/55/EC  of  the  European  Parliament 
and of the Council concerning the Common Rules for 
the  Internal  Market  in  Natural  Gas  and  Repealing 
Directive 98/30/EC, OJ 2003 L176/57 
31  Directive  09/73/EC  of  the  European  Parliament 
and of the Council concerning the Common Rules for 
the  Internal  Market  in  Natural  Gas  and  Repealing 
Directive 03/55/EC, OJ 2009 L211/94. 6 | ALAN RILEY 
 
June  2005.32  The  Sectoral  Inquiry  was  a  major 
investigation into anti-competitive activity across 
the  European  electricity  and  gas  markets.  The 
evidence  provided  by  DG  Competition,  which 
was largely overlooked by the media and most 
commentators,  indicated  that  there  was 
widespread anti-competitive activity across both 
sectors.  
This evidence amounts to a standing indictment 
of  the  capital  misallocation,  consumer  loss  and 
damage  to  competitiveness  caused  by  the 
vertically  integrated  national  energy  champion 
model adopted in so many member states.33 The 
Commission  identified  very  high  levels  of 
market  concentration  notwithstanding  the 
liberalisation  process  already  undertaken. 
Significant  evidence  of  vertical  foreclosure  of 
national  markets,  combined  with  lack  of  cross-
border  sales  and  of  market  transparency  and 
defective  price  formation.  It  also  found  little 
competition  in  downstream  markets  and  that 
balancing  markets  favoured  domestic 
incumbents.34 
The Inquiry also provided the Commission with 
good  reasons  to  press  ahead  in  prosecuting 
energy companies for breach of the competition 
rules and evidence with which to do so. Over a 
dozen  major  European  energy  companies  were 
prosecuted including EDF,35 GDF/Suez,36 E.ON37 
and RWE.38 
                                                   
32  Sector  Inquiry  Pursuant  to  Article  17  of  Regulation 
1/2003  in  the  European  Electricity  and  Gas  Markets, 
Communication by Ms. Neelie Kroes in Agreement with 
Mr Piebalgs, Brussels June 2005. 
33 In fact, the mirror image of the Gazprom model. 
34  Communication  from  the  Commission,  Inquiry 
Pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation (EC) No.1/2003 
into the European Gas and Electricity Sectors (Final 
Report). COM (2006) 851 Final, January 10th 2007, 5-9. 
For  a  more  detailed  analysis,  see  DG  Competition 
Report on Energy Sector Inquiry, SEC (2006) 1724, 10th 
January 2007, Part 1 Gas Market Report. 
35 EDF, Long-Term Contracts in France, COMP/39.386, 
March 2010. 
36  E.ON/GDF,  Market  Allocation  in  European  Gas 
Markets,  Case  COMP/39.401;  GDF  Foreclosure,  Case 
Comp/B-1/39.316. 
37  E.ON/GDF,  op.  cit.  and  E.ON  Gas  Foreclosure, 
Comp/B-1/39.317. 
38 RWE, Gas Foreclosure, COMP/39.402. 
For  the  Commission  the  Gazprom  case  is 
therefore  an  issue  of  completing  a  wider 
investigation  into  the  enforcement  of  the 
competition rules in the context of the object of 
creating a liberalised European gas market. The 
Commission  has  finally  turned  eastward  to 
apply  those  rules  to  the  member  states  that 
joined in 2004 and 2007. 
We know that the Commission received at least 
one  formal  complaint  from  the  Lithuanian 
government with respect to exploitative pricing 
in their gas market. Lithuania is a ‘gas island’. It 
currently receives all of  its gas from Gazprom. 
The price it pays for its gas varies but in recent 
years it has been significantly higher than prices 
paid  by  Gazprom  customers  in  Western 
Europe.39  In  the  autumn  of  2011,  DG 
Competition  also  undertook  a  number  of 
unannounced inspections or ‘dawn raids’ of the 
business  premises  of  Gazprom  in  the  Czech 
Republic and Germany, as well as at a number of 
other  energy  companies  with  contractual 
relations with Gazprom across the Central and 
Eastern Europe states.40 
One  particular  lesson  can  be  learnt  from  the 
existence of the dozen or so cases in which DG 
Competition  has  actually  prosecuted  energy 
companies by filing a prosecution document (the 
Statement  of  Objections).  In  most  cases  rather 
than  an  issuing  a  prohibition  decision,  DG 
Competition used the threat of the publication of 
a  400+  page  prohibition  decision  to  encourage 
settlement  via  a  Commitment  Decision.  For 
example, E.ON and RWE were both faced with a 
prohibition decision which, if published, would 
have set out chapter and verse the nature of their 
breaches  of  EU  antitrust  law.  Worse  still, 
publication  would  have  provided  energy-
intensive  customers  of  E.ON  and  RWE  with  a 
route map to bring civil claims for damages. One 
major issue for energy companies is that, unlike 
                                                   
39  “Vilnius  to  Hit  at  Gazprom  in  EU  Complaint”, 
Financial Times, January 2011.  
40 EU Competition Law-Dawn Raids, Gazprom Case, 27th 
September  2011  (http://www.graystoncompany.com/ 
gco/gaco-blog/entry/eu-update-competition-law-
dawn-raids).  This  blog  provides  a  useful  map 
indicating  the  location  of  the  Commission’s 
unannounced inspections under Art. 20 of Regulation 
1/2003 (known as dawn raids) in September 2011 in 
respect of the Gazprom investigation. COMMISSION V. GAZPROM: THE ANTITRUST CLASH OF THE DECADE? | 7 
 
other  forms  of  abuse  of  dominance  and  even 
price-fixing  cartel  cases,  the  damages  claims 
could potentially be very large. This is because of 
the  length  of  period  for  which  many  of  the 
alleged  anti-competitive  activities  have  been 
going on.41 In some cases, there are allegations 
that the cases stretch back to the 1970s.42  
Not unreasonably and as a consequence, E.ON 
and  RWE  were  happy  to  seek  a  formal 
Commitment Decision which meant that the full 
nature of the allegations against those firms did 
not enter the public domain. However, the price 
was high. In both cases, DG Competition insisted 
on the ‘unbundling’ of their electricity and gas 
networks. The question that has to be asked in 
the  case  of  Gazprom  is  whether  the  Gazprom 
Board and the Kremlin will be willing to give DG 
Competition its ‘pound of flesh’. There is likely 
to  be  a  very  significant  gap  between  the  price 
that they are willing to pay for a settlement and 
the  price  that  DG  Competition  is  willing  to 
accept,  even  when  facing  the  prospect  of 
publication  of  a  prohibition  decision,  fines  and 
civil damages.43 If this view of the case is correct, 
                                                   
41 It is not sufficient to defend Gazprom from claims 
going back many years to argue that such claims can 
only  start  from  accession.  This  is  true  of  EU 
competition claims. However, from the mid-1990s at 
the latest, all accession states that joined the European 
Union in 2004 and 2007 had to introduce into national 
law by virtue of the Europe Agreements, homologue 
antitrust  provisions  mirrored  on  EU  antitrust  law. 
Hence  it  is  conceivable  that  claims  could  be  made 
going back to the mid-1990s. There would, however, 
be the prospect of a defence for Gazprom based on 
limitation periods applicable under national law. One 
of  the  major  issues  for  any  national  court  case  for 
damages  would  be  whether there was a  continuing 
breach of national rules which would then permit a 
claim to be made for the period before 2004 or 2007 
when only national law would apply. 
42  In  the  GDF/E.ON  Market  Allocation  case,  the  core 
allegation concerned an initial agreement dating back 
to 1975, GDF/E.ON, op. cit. 
43  Plaintiffs  seeking  to  obtain  civil  damages  against 
Gazprom may be able to extend the rule in Case C-
360/09 Pfeiderer AG v. Bundeskartellamt, ECJ, 14 June 
2011.  In  that  case  the  Court  indicated  that  EU  law 
does  not  prohibit  access  to  leniency  documents 
(documents  obtained  in  respect  of  a  price-fixing 
cartel)  by  plaintiffs  seeking  damages.  The  issue  the 
Court  ruled  was  one  for  national  law.  There  is  a 
difference  between  documents  obtained  under  a 
then  a  settlement  via  a Commitments Decision 
will be difficult to secure. 
It is also difficult to believe that political pressure 
on DG Competition will have much influence. In 
neither  GE/Honeywell  nor  Microsoft,  both 
commenced when the United States was at the 
height of its political and economic power were 
affected  by  US  political  pressure.  Equally,  DG 
Competition’s record within the European Union 
is  one  of  a  determination  to  ensure  full 
application  of  the  competition  acquis  even 
against  ingrained  and  powerful  member  state 
views  in  favour  of  corporate  champions  in 
sectors  from  airlines,  to  chemicals  to  energy 
markets.  Even  in  the  course  of  the  economic 
crisis,  DG  Competition  has  not  flinched  from 
continuing to apply the competition rules in full. 
The European Union has seen no equivalent to 
the  US  National  Industrial  Recovery  Act  1933 
which  suspended  the  operation  of  the 
competition  rules  in  specific  market  sectors 
during the Great Depression.44 
                                                                                     
leniency  application  and  deployed  in  a  prohibition 
decision  and  obtaining  documents  under  a 
Commitment  Decision.  One  can  argue  that  the 
operation  of  Commitment  Decisions  would  be 
undermined  if  documentation  obtained  for  that 
purpose  were  available  for  damages  claims.  The 
difficulty is that the same argument could be made 
for  leniency  applications.  In  the  United  States,  the 
government  has  taken  steps  to  limit  leniency 
applications  liability  in  order  to  maintain  the 
incentive to come forward. The underlying argument 
is the same for both cases that plaintiffs have a right 
to  damages  under  EU  law and  if  public  authorities 
(either  EU  or  national)  have  documentary  evidence 
that would assist their case, there is a lawful EU right 
to  obtain  that  documentation,  subject  only  to 
legitimate business confidentiality. 
44  Although  the  US  judiciary  has  referred  to  the 
Sherman Act as the “Magna Carta of Free Enterprise” 
in United States v. Topco Associates Inc (1972) 405 US 
596, 610, per Justice Thurgood Marshall, the Sherman 
Act  is  not  part  of  the  US  Constitution  and  is  not 
entrenched  within  the  American  legal  system.  This 
does  mean  that  under  extreme  political  stress,  as 
during the Great Depression, the antitrust regime can 
buckle. Such buckling is far more difficult to achieve 
within  the  EU’s  legal  order  because  of  the 
constitutional  status  of  Arts  101  and  102.  Being 
entrenched  within  the  EU’s  legal  order,  it  is  much 
more difficult for any of the core parts of the law to be 
overridden  by  Parliament  or  Council  and  political 8 | ALAN RILEY 
 
In the energy sector specifically, DG Competition 
has  admirably  held  the  line  and  continued  to 
prosecute the major European energy companies 
in the teeth of political opposition from a number 
of powerful member states. If DG Competition 
could withstand political opposition from within 
the  European  Union,  they  will  be  surely  in  a 
better position to withstand opposition when it 
comes  from  Gazprom  and  the  Kremlin. 
Furthermore,  given  the  complaint  from 
Lithuania,  and  the  support  Lithuania  has 
received from several other member states, DG 
Competition  has  to  be  aware  of  the  danger  of 
any sub-optimal resolution of the case resulting 
in  a  challenge  to  any  weak  Commitment 
Decision. It would be an unimaginable political 
disaster  for  DG  Competition  to  have  member 
states  launching  an  application  to  challenge  a 
Commitment Decision or bringing an action for 
failure to act. 
More  fundamentally,  the  difficulty  here  for 
Gazprom  is  that,  if  these  allegations  are  true, 
they  involve  substantial  ‘hard-core’  offences 
under European antitrust law. DG Competition 
then has no alternative but to apply the acquis. 
Denial  of  third-party  access;  suppression  of 
market  access;  prohibition  on  resale  and 
exploitative  pricing  are  all  serious  antitrust 
offences. The Commission cannot simply ‘turn a 
blind eye’ as a result of political pressure coming 
from within or outside the Union. 
4.  The Gazprom case 
The  launch  of  DG  Competition’s  case  against 
Gazprom  involves  in  essence  three  principal 
allegations  with  respect  to  resale  obligations, 
suppression  of  alternative  competition  and 
pricing.  Whilst  the  allegations  may  appear 
technical,  if  proved  they  could  have  a  major 
negative impact on Gazprom’s current business 
model and operations. 
4.1  Allegation of resale protection: The 
‘destination clauses’ 
The  first  allegation  is  concerned  with  resale 
prohibition  or  destination  clauses.  These  are 
clauses  and/or  market  practices  that  have  the 
                                                                                     
pressure comes finds it much more difficult to gain 
traction. 
effect of preventing the resale of gas contracted 
from  Gazprom  to  third  parties.  This  is  a 
particularly onerous provision because the long-
term  supply  contracts  are  also  subject  to  take-
and-pay  clauses,  which  force  Gazprom 
customers to take all quantities of gas that have 
been contracted for even if there is not a market 
for  such  gas.  Furthermore,  the  contract  will 
usually  be  for  a  very  high  percentage  of  total 
consumption. 
Such clauses will be viewed by DG Competition 
as  hard-core  antitrust  restrictions  to  the  extent 
they  have  the  effect  of  splitting  up  the  single 
market and undermining the creation of a single 
market in gas. This is due to the fact that resale 
clauses essentially prohibit onward sales across 
national borders, which is an inherent restriction 
on the free movement of goods across the single 
market.  If  such  clauses  or  practices  are  found, 
DG Competition must seek their termination.  
If  the  case  consisted  only  of  resale  prohibition 
clauses,  then  DG  Competition  and  Gazprom 
could relatively easily undertake a settlement, as 
was  done  informally  at  the  beginning  of  the 
century  with  respect  to  long-term  supply 
contracts with Western European customers.45 
4.2  Allegations concerning denial or 
limits on third-party access 
However,  the  second  head  of  allegations  is 
potentially much more serious: prevention of the 
diversification of the supply of gas. This includes 
denial  of  third-party  access  to  pipelines  as 
competitors of Gazprom seek, and are refused, 
access  to  sell  their  gas.  This  could  have  been 
achieved  by  Gazprom’s  ownership  of 
downstream  assets,  or  through  its  minority 
shareholdings  in  downstream  assets  combined 
with  its  market  power  derived  from  its 
monopoly or quasi-monopoly supply of gas. 
What  will  be  particularly  interesting  to  see  is 
what  other  prevention  or  restriction  of  supply 
issues arise from the case. These could include 
seeking  as  a  dominant  company  to  impede 
alternative supply projects not under its control 
                                                   
45 “Commission reaches breakthrough with Gazprom 
and  ENI  on  territorial  restriction  clauses”, 
Commission  Press  Release,  6th  October  2003, 
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such  as  LNG  gasification  stations  or  proposed 
new pipelines. These issues will depend on the 
evidence available to DG Competition as a result 
of  the  unannounced  raids  it  carried  out  on 
Gazprom’s  premises  and  that  of  other  energy 
firms  and  information  obtained  via 
complainants. 
The difficulty for Gazprom is that unlike Section 
2 of the Sherman Act, which deals with abuse of 
dominance  via  claims  for  monopolization,  the 
EU’s abuse of dominance provision has a much 
wider  reach.  The  EU  General  Court  and  the 
European Court of Justice have resisted taking a 
narrower  economic  approach  to  the 
interpretation  of  Art.  102  TFEU,  the  abuse  of 
dominance  provision.  They  have  reiterated  the 
existing case law which emphasises the ‘special 
responsibility’ of dominant companies to respect 
competition and competitors and the traditional 
‘as  if’  standard  which  requires  dominant 
companies to act as if there is competition in the 
market. This standard of responsibility may well 
be  difficult  for  Gazprom  to  entirely  reconcile 
with its current business practices.  
4.3  Allegations of unfair pricing 
The  third  issue  raised  is  unfair  pricing,  in 
particular, the linking of the price of gas to oil 
(oil  price  indexation).  Price  indexation  in  long-
term gas contracts is perceived to be at the very 
heart of Gazprom’s ability to maintain revenues 
and  pricing  power.  However,  it  is  open  to 
question  whether  it  is  acceptable  under  EU 
antitrust law. The questions to be decided by DG 
Competition  are  whether  or  not  a  dominant 
company  in  the  gas  supply  sector  can  link  its 
prices to oil when there is no basis in modern gas 
markets for such a link and, whether such a link 
constitutes of itself an abuse of dominance. 
Historically the link made some sense as oil was 
also  used  for  heating  and  power  generation. 
However, since the oil price shock of 1973 non-
transportation  utilization  of  oil  has  declined 
dramatically  in  significance.  Only  2.6%  of 
Europe’s power generation is from oil, whereas, 
power  generation  from  gas  is  23.6%46  and 
                                                   
46  Gross  Electricity  Generation  by  Fuel  in  2010,  82, 
Energy  in  the  EU  2012,  Eurostat  Luxembourg 
(http://ec.europa.eu/energy/publications/doc/2012
_energy_figures.pdf). 
represents  more  than  70%  of  total  gas 
consumption.  
If indexation were to be found to be abusive the 
consequences  could  be  profound  and  go  well 
beyond the markets of the Central and Eastern 
Europe states. In the first place such a ruling, if 
upheld by the EU courts, would potentially be 
applied by arbitration panels seeking to dispose 
of  arguments  between  Gazprom  and  Western 
European  energy  companies  challenging 
indexation under arbitration clauses. Arbitration 
panels have an obligation to apply EU antitrust 
law in cases where the governing law of the case 
is  the  law  of  a  member  state,  and  where  as  a 
consequence  EU  law  would  also  apply.  The 
danger therefore is of a significant spill over into 
many  other  disputes  over  indexation,  at  least 
where  Gazprom  reaches  the  dominance 
threshold.47 
It is also likely that any European ruling against 
indexation will be used worldwide to challenge 
its legitimacy. For instance, it is likely that China, 
currently in negotiations with Gazprom over the 
price  it  is  willing  to  pay  for  gas  from  Eastern 
Siberia, will deploy antitrust arguments to seek 
to avoid prices linked to oil. It could also spur a 
new  round  of  arbitration  cases  as  Gazprom’s 
customers in Western Europe begin to argue that 
a  Commission  decision  outlawing  indexation 
and upheld by the EU courts constitutes a major 
structural  change  or  ‘event’  in  the  market 
triggering  a  price  review  under  their  existing 
contracts.48  This  could  then  result  in  almost 
every  existing  long  term  supply  contract  with 
Gazprom being challenged via arbitration panels 
across the continent. 
The timeline for such a case of this complexity 
and weight is probably approximately two years 
to a prohibition decision and a further two years 
before  disposal  of  the  main  issues  in  the  EU 
General Court. There may be both an appeal on 
                                                   
47  The  bright  line  test  for  dominance  is  usually 
thought  of  applying  at  above  40%.  Depending  on 
market  conditions,  such  as  barriers  to  entry  and 
concentration  dominance  can  fall  below  and  above 
40%. 
48  For  a  discussion  of  price  review  triggers,  see  B. 
Holland and P.S. Ashley, “Natural Gas Price Reviews: 
Past,  Present  and  Future”,  Journal  of  Energy  and 
Natural Resources Law, Vol. 30, No. 1, 2012. 10 | ALAN RILEY 
 
point  of  law  to  the  European  Court  of  Justice, 
which  could  take  a  further  two  years.  In 
addition, as in Microsoft, if there is resistance to 
any  prohibition  there  could  be  a  number  of 
satellite decisions and cases to the main decision. 
5.  Russia’s initial reaction 
The initial Russian reaction has been to introduce 
a  Federal  Decree  under  which  all  ‘strategic 
enterprises’  to  obtain  consent  for  their  foreign 
economic  activity  with  the  government.49 
Strategic  enterprises  and  their  subsidiaries  will 
in future only be able to disclose information to 
foreign  governments  and  international 
organisations  with  the  consent  of  the  Russian 
government.  Consent  will  also  be  required  to 
amendments  to  contracts  and  commercial 
pricing policy. 
Practically this blocking statute is likely to have 
very  little  effect.  In  the  first  place  DG 
Competition  has  already  raided  Gazprom’s 
offices  in  the  Czech  Republic  and  Germany.  It 
has  also  been  able  to  obtain  information  from 
other energy companies Gazprom does business 
with  and  from  complainants.  In  respect  of  the 
Federal Decree it looks like a case of shutting the 
door after the horse has bolted.  
Even after the Decree, it is open to question how 
effective  it  will  be.  While  there  is  European 
Union case law that state compulsion provides a 
defence  to  EU  competition  obligations  this 
would  not  necessarily  cover  all  information 
gathering  exercises.50  DG  Competition  may 
decide  not  to  ask  Gazprom  officials  to  answer 
questions under threat of enforcement sanctions 
                                                   
49  Presidential Decree  to  help  Gazprom in  Standoff  with 
European Commission, ITAR-TASS, 12 September 2012 
(http://www.itar-tass.com/en/c39/518529.html). 
50 There is little case law on the position of foreign 
sovereigns who issue compulsory rules binding their 
companies to breach the competition rules. Respected 
commentators suggest that in such circumstances the 
state  compulsion  doctrine  that  applies  to  national 
measures  would  apply  to  measures  of  a  foreign 
sovereign.  They  would  however  have  to  be 
compulsory, i.e. requiring a company to act in a way 
that  infringed  the  competition  rules.  See  E.  Roth, 
Bellamy  &  Child  EU  Law  of  Competition,  para11.004, 
Oxford, 2008.  
under Art. 18 of Regulation 1 given the Federal 
Decree.51  
However,  there  is  nothing  to  stop  DG 
Competition  issuing  Art.  18  decisions  against 
Gazprom allies and commercial partners within 
the European Union. It is also open to question 
how  far  any  Federal  Decree  would  be  given 
effect  to  in  the  European  Union  in  respect  of 
Member  State  registered  companies  operating 
within  the  Union.  In  addition,  it  may  in  fact 
encourage  DG  Competition  to  undertake  more 
unannounced  inspections  against  Gazprom 
instead.52 The point about raids is that they can 
be  carried  out  without  the  co-operation  of  the 
officials and employees of the business with the 
Commission calling upon the police power of the 
local Member States to undertake its search.53 
Equally it is open to question how effective state 
consent  to  contractual  changes  and  pricing 
policy  can  be  in  protecting  Gazprom  from  DG 
Competition’s  investigation.  Again  the  Federal 
Decree may in fact encourage DG Competition to 
take  more  coercive  structural  measures  against 
Gazprom  rather  than  seeking  contractual 
amendments.54  
For  instance  if  DG  Competition  is  faced  with 
evidence  of  suppression  of  alternative 
competitors  via  Gazprom’s  ownership  and 
                                                   
51 Art. 18 permits the Commission to seek answers to 
questions  in respect of  antitrust  investigation  under 
the threat of significant financial sanctions against the 
target  company.  These  Art.  18  requests  are  usually 
made  following  an  unannounced  inspection  on  the 
business premises of the target company. 
52 Under Arts 20 and 21 of Regulation 1/2003. 
53 Bellamy & Child, op. cit., para 13.045 
54  Under  Article  7  of  Regulation  1/2003  the 
Commission’s  power  to  terminate  infringements 
includes  the  power  to  impose  ‘behavioural  or 
structural  remedies  which  are  proportionate  to  the 
infringement committed and which are necessary to 
bring  the  infringement to  an  end’.  The  limit  to  any 
structural  measures  lies  in  the  strength  of  the  link 
between  the  antitrust  offence  and  the  proposed 
measures.  For  instance,  if  it  was  demonstrated  that 
downstream assets owned or controlled by Gazprom 
were  a  significant  facilitator  in  respect  of  denial  of 
third party access to competitors then one option for 
the Commission to consider would to order the sale of 
such  assets.  For  further  discussion  see  Bellamy  & 
Child, op. cit., para 13.128.  COMMISSION V. GAZPROM: THE ANTITRUST CLASH OF THE DECADE? | 11 
 
control  of  pipeline  assets,  it  can  order  sale  of 
those assets if it finds it difficult to negotiate with 
Moscow because of a blocking statute. It can take 
such action under Art. 7 of Regulation 1 when 
there is a connection between the assets and the 
antitrust  behaviour  uncovered  in  the 
investigation.  This  would  suggest  that 
Gazprom’s pipeline assets in the affected regions 
of  the  EU,  including  potentially  minority 
shareholdings  in  pipeline  assets,  could  be 
required to be sold. Given that the assets are on 
the territory of the member states, it is difficult to 
see how any Russian Federation statute blocking 
such  sales  would  be  given  effect  by  the  EU 
courts.  In  addition,  the  Commission  can  avoid 
direct  conflict  with  a  blocking  statute55  by 
appointing a monitoring trustee. Such a trustee 
was appointed in the Microsoft case.56 The trustee 
could  police  the  pipeline  assets  of  corporate 
allies,  other  Russian  energy  companies  and 
favoured customers of Gazprom for whom there 
is evidence that they have or are likely to take 
instructions from Gazprom.  
A particular difficulty here is that any attempt to 
invoke  state  compulsion  would  only  apply 
prospectively.  It  is  doubtful  that  either  the 
European  Commission  or  ultimately  the 
European  Court  of  Justice  would  accept  the 
application  of  a  retrospective  state  compulsion 
doctrine.  If  this  view  of  the  approach  of  the 
Commission  and  Court  is  correct,  DG 
Competition  would  be  able  at  least  to  fine 
Gazprom  for  past  behaviour  whatever  the 
contents of this or any future Federal Decree.57 
There is also the further difficulty that most of 
the acts that DG Competition allege occurred in 
whole or in part on the territory of the member 
                                                   
55 There may well a formal conflict in that a ‘no asset 
sales’  rule  may  apply  in  the  blocking  statute. 
However, as argued above, such a rule would be seen 
as  interference  in  the  sovereignty  of  the  member 
states and would not be applied by the EU courts. 
56 Bellamy & Child, op. cit., para 13.130. 
57  There  is  little  law  on  this  point.  However,  as  a 
matter of principle, it is difficult to see how the EU 
Courts  would  accept  retrospective  compulsion 
doctrines as a defence to antitrust liability. In the only 
case on the books – AROW/BNIC OJ 1982 L379/1 – a 
Commission  decision  applied  the  antitrust  rules  in 
full  where  a  state  had  attempted  to  retrospectively 
immunise acts in contravention of those rules. 
states  and  involved  Gazprom-controlled 
companies registered in EU or EEA states. The 
Commission  and  the  Court  may  well  take  the 
view  that  the  Federal  Decree  when  applied  to 
such acts is a direct interference in the national 
sovereignty of the member states.  
This view of the impact of the Federal Decree is 
likely  to  be  reinforced  with  respect  to  the 
argument  that  the  EU  institutions  and  its 
member  states  have  a  sovereign  right  to 
structure and re-structure their energy supply as 
they see fit. Attempts by a foreign government to 
seek to maintain a particular energy system on 
the  territory  of  other  states  is  an  interference 
with those states’ sovereign rights. 
The  argument  here  is  underpinned  by  two 
observations. First, although the defence of the 
Commission’s  position  can  be  made  under  the 
traditional territoriality principle of jurisdiction, 
the  Commission  recognises  a  broader-based 
‘effects’-like  jurisdictional  doctrine.  Drawing 
from the Wood Pulp58 and Gencor59 case law, the 
EU  courts  have  developed  a  doctrine  of  extra-
territoriality.  This  doctrine  permits  European 
Union law to extend to operations, agreements 
and practices which although they are initiated 
outside the Union are implemented or have an 
immediate, substantial and foreseeable effect on 
the territory of the member states. 
The Russian Federation could seek to argue as in 
Gencor that as a matter of comity to take account 
of  important  policy  concerns  of  other  states 
where  the  contested  practices  were  initiated, 
European  antitrust  law  should  not  be  applied. 
There  are  a  number  of  problems  with  this 
approach. First, although a balancing of interests 
comity doctrine has been recognised by some US 
superior courts, it has not been recognised by the 
EU  courts.60  Second,  as  discussed  above,  it  is 
                                                   
58 Joined Cases C-89/85 et seq [1988] ECR 5193. 
59 Case T-102/96 [1999] ECR II-753. 
60 See Timberlane Lumber Co v. Bank of America [1976] 
549 F.2d 597. This case should now be read alongside 
the  US  Federal  Statute, the  Foreign  Trade  Antitrust 
Improvements  Act  1982,  adopted  post-Timberlane 
and the  ruling of the US Supreme Court in F.Hoffman 
La Roche Ltd v. Empagran SA [2004] 542 US 155. The 
nearest  explicit  discussion  comes  in  Eastern 
Aluminium  OJ  1985  L92/1.  In  that  case,  the 
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difficult to see how the Commission and the EU 
Courts  would  permit  the  sovereign  rights  of  a 
foreign  state  to  prevail  on  the  territory  of  the 
member states over such a primary objectives of 
European Union law as the creation of a single 
market  in  gas,  free  flow  of  gas  across  national 
borders,  market  liberalisation  and  full 
application  of  Union  antitrust  rules.  The 
difficulty  with  any  comity  argument  in  the 
Gazprom  case  is  that  it  would  be  to  accept  a 
Russian  argument  for  a  largely  extra-territorial 
application  of  Russian  objectives  on  the soil  of 
the member states. 
Thirdly, to the extent that the EU itself is making 
some  extra-territorial  claims,  it  is  also  worth 
pointing  out  that  the  Russian  competition  law 
applies the same EU extra-territorial jurisdiction. 
This  existence  of  a  Russian  ‘effects  doctrine’ 
significantly  weakens  the  Russian  case  against 
the  Commission’s  jurisdiction  in  the  Gazprom 
case,  to  the  extent  that  the  Union  makes  such 
claims in the case.61  
                                                                                     
show self-restraint in the exercise of jurisdiction when 
it would require undertakings to act contrary to the 
requirements  of  national  law  or  the  important 
interests of non-member states. It went on to suggest 
however  that  such  interests  would  have  to  be  so 
important  that  they  would  prevail  over  the  Treaty-
based  objectives  of  European  competition  law.  The 
difficulty, it is submitted, with that approach from the 
perspective of Gazprom is that Eastern Aluminium was 
decided  prior  to  the  collapse  of  the  Soviet  Union 
when the Community had to grapple with applying 
the competition rules with respect to entities from an 
avowedly  non-market  state  command  economy.  By 
contrast,  the  Russian  Federation  is  formally 
committed to an open market economy, reinforced by 
its  1991  enactment  of  a  competition  law  and  the 
improvements in the law over the last two decades. It 
is difficult to see therefore how the application of core 
competition  rules  by  the  European  Commission  to 
entities  that  operate  within  the  territory  of  the 
member  states  would  ever  be  able  to  mount  a 
successful  claim  to  their  own  state  interests  to  be 
prioritized over those of the Union. 
61  Art.  3(2)  on  the  Federal  Law  on  Protection  of 
Competition  reads:  “Provisions  of  this  Federal  Law 
are  applicable  to  the  agreements  reached  between 
Russian  and  (or)  foreign  persons  or  organisations 
outside the Russian Federation, as well as to actions 
performed  by  them,  if  such  agreements  or  actions 
affect  the  state  of  competition  in  the  Russian 
Federation.”  Translation  from  the  Russian  Federal 
The  second  observation  is  to  look  at  the  one 
country  that  maintained  a  principled  stand 
against  extra-territorial  antitrust  claims  of  the 
United  States  for  over  a  century.  It  is  worth 
contrasting the approach of the United Kingdom 
which  for  more  than  100  years  maintained  a 
principled stand against the United States with 
respect to the US effects doctrine. The UK even 
adopted what is the world’s most sophisticated 
antitrust  blocking  statute  in  the  Protection  of 
Trading Interests Act 1980.62 The UK’s position 
was credible in international law as it has based 
its  position  on  the  traditional  territoriality 
principle and sustained it for decades. It never 
made  extra-territorial  claims  itself.  By  contrast, 
as  explained  above,  the  Russian  government 
makes the same claims as the European Union 
and  has  done  since  the  modern  inception  of 
Russian  competition  law  in  the  1990s.  It  is 
difficult  for  the  Russian  Federation  therefore 
now  to  turn  round  and  run  a  compelling 
territorial  argument  calling  for  restricted 
sovereignty  with  regard  to  the  impact  of  EU 
antitrust laws on one of its major companies. 
There will no doubt be an extensive debate and 
argument over the application of the competition 
rules in a context of a foreign state supporting an 
alleged antitrust delinquent.  However, what the 
Kremlin seems to have overlooked is the damage 
the  wrangling  over  the  case  is  likely  to  have 
Gazprom’s already-precarious hold over Central 
and Eastern Europe states. 
The  greatest  commercial  danger  is  that  just  as 
with the 2009 gas cut-off, Russian over-reaction 
in  the  Gazprom  case  will  undermine  the 
company’s  market  position.  Once  the  member 
states  see  more  threats  and  threats  of  non-
compliance with EU law coming out of Moscow, 
they will start accelerating their search for new 
gas sources, be it shale gas, LNG or new pipeline 
sources. In other words, by taking an aggressive 
confrontational  approach  to  DG  Competition’s 
investigation,  Gazprom  would  actually  be 
undermining its own market position. 
                                                                                     
Antimonopoly  Service’s  website 
(http://en.fas.gov.ru/legislation/legislation_50915.ht
ml). 
62  A.V.  Lowe,  “Blocking  Extraterritorial  Jurisdiction: 
The British Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980”, 
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6.  Settlement proposals and 
conclusions 
As  a  matter  of  enlightened  self-interest,  the 
Kremlin should be seeking to use the Gazprom 
case to force change within the company and in 
the  broader  Russian  gas  market.  Leaving 
Gazprom  as  the  dominant  player  in  the 
exploration,  production,  wholesale  and  retail 
levels  of  the  market,  combined  with  its  export 
and pipeline monopoly is not good for Russian 
economic  development  or  for  Russian 
consumers. The ability of gas independents such 
as Novatek to challenge Gazprom will always be 
limited  under  current  market  and  regulatory 
conditions.  
Aside  from  the  immediate  inefficiencies  in  the 
Russian  gas  market  derived  from  such  market 
dominance, there is the broader problem of the 
declining  Nadym  pur  Taz  fields  where 
approximately 80% of Russian gas is produced. 
One major new field is being brought on-stream. 
However, according to the IEA, Russia will have 
to replace 635bcm of production by 2035, that is, 
approximately  80%  of  current  production.  The 
cost  of  new  investment  in  gas  fields  and 
transmission networks is put at $730 billion.63  
By contrast the main focus of current Gazprom 
investment policy is to build Nordstream 3 and 4 
and  Southstream.  These  are  essentially 
diversionary  pipelines  which  do  not  tackle  the 
scale  of  investment  required  in  new  fields  and 
transmission  upgrade  to  the  main  Russian 
pipeline network, the UGSS. 
Furthermore, the threat of cheaper gas supplies 
entering Europe as LNG or domestic shale gas, 
and the prospect of gas or coal dumping should 
make  the  Kremlin  question  mammoth 
development  projects  like  Bovanenko.64  The 
danger for Gazprom is that if it continues with a 
high-priced energy development strategy, it will 
find it difficult to raise the investment for its new 
fields or face the prospect of huge losses on its 
gas sales. 
                                                   
63 IEA, World Energy Outlook 2011, 310, Paris. 
64 For a discussion of Russian resources, see Y. Grama, 
“Analysis  of  Russian  Oil  and  Gas  Reserves”, 
International  Journal  of  Energy  Economics  and 
Policy, Vol. 82, 2012. 
There is an alternative. Gazprom has huge gas 
resources,  including  shale  gas  and  secondary 
conventional fields, around its existing pipeline 
infrastructure. There is a compelling argument to 
develop these cheaper to develop resources than 
resources in the high north or in the Arctic Sea. 
However, to develop these resources, a degree of 
market  efficiency,  high-level  technology  and 
market  competition  would  be  necessary  to 
ensure effective development. In other words a 
liberalised  market  structure  would  be  required 
which would put a premium on efficiency and 
innovation. The real question here is whether the 
Kremlin would be willing to contemplate some 
degree  of  market  liberalisation  for  access  to 
cheaper and more substantial gas resources.  
There is also a major opportunity for the Russian 
gas market if the Kremlin decides to liberalise. 
The  shale  gas  revolution  does  not  only  affect 
Gazprom, it also is having a profound effect on 
the  European  energy  market.  Current  climate 
change strategy is running into the sand, in the 
face  of  rising  costs  and  economic  crisis.  The 
Union  is  going  to  be  forced  to  develop  an 
alternative approach around deploying more gas 
and reducing coal in order to cut CO2 emissions 
in  the  short  to  medium  term.65  It  is  also  likely 
that  Europe  will  follow  the  US  example  of 
increasingly switching to gas transportation. As 
a  consequence,  the  size  of  the  gas  market  will 
expand in Europe. For the Russian gas market, 
such  an  expansion  would  be  a  significant 
opportunity to increase gas sales. 
The  Kremlin  should  be  giving  serious 
consideration  to  negotiating  a  Commitment 
Decision  with  DG  Competition  that  puts 
                                                   
65 The advantage of gas during the economic crisis is 
underlined by the European Gas Advocacy Forum 
in  their  paper  “Making  the  Green  Journey  Work”, 
Brussels, 2011. That paper points out that CCGT gas 
turbines  in  Europe  have  a  load  factor  of 
approximately 45%. If the load factor was raised from 
45%  to  65%  to  70%,  and  assuming  the  equivalent 
amount  of  coal  fired  generation  was  removed,  the 
CO2 abatement would be on the order of 300 million 
tonnes  annually,  approximately  one-third  of  CO2 
emissions  from  coal  and  lignite  in  the  European 
Union.  To  achieve  the  same  CO2  abatement  by 
deploying current renewable technology would cost 
approximately  €80-120  billion  of  new  capital 
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pressure on Gazprom to face up to liberalisation. 
This  would  involve  as  part  of  the  decision 
accepting  the  unbundling  rules;  selling  or 
isolating  downstream  assets  from  supply 
operations and providing more gas into existing 
hubs.  Internally,  the  case  should  be  made  to 
liberalise the market in order to keep prices low 
domestically  and  enable  Russian  gas  to  be 
competitive on the European market. 
Sadly, it looks unlikely that the Kremlin will act 
in Russia’s own enlightened self-interest. If the 
Federal Decree is any guide, there is likely to be 
resistance  at  every  stage  of  the  EU’s  antitrust 
process.  The  recent  Rosneft/BP-TNK  deal 
suggests  that  the  focus  of  Russian  power  and 
interest is now concentrated entirely upon the oil 
industry.  The  Kremlin’s  strategy  may  come 
down to the view that oil prices will not move 
far from $100 per barrel a day and the industry 
will be able to deliver approximately 10 million 
b/d.  As  a  consequence,  rather  than  seeing  the 
Russian gas market as something that is core to 
the  state’s  revenues,  it  may  instead  be  seen  as 
source of power that is to be defended. In that 
case,  the  consequence  may  be  that  EU-Russia 
relations are in for a rough ride.  
We  therefore  face  the  prospect  of  DG 
Competition  legitimately  applying  the 
procedures,  legislation  and  case  law  of  the 
Union’s  antitrust  acquis  in  a  methodical 
evidence-based  manner.  At  each  step  of  the 
process,  an  increasingly  exasperated  Kremlin 
will be furiously lobbying major EU capitals to 
bring  the  process  to  a  halt.  The  explanations 
from  London,  Berlin  and  Paris  as  to  the 
application of the rule of law and the autonomy 
of the Commission will be disbelieved. There is 
therefore the prospect that in a stand-off between 
the  Venusian  Europeans  and  the  Martian 
Russians66  we  will  see  a  slash-and-burn  gas 
policy  from  an  uncomprehending  and  furious 
Moscow. In turn, DG Competition in Venusian 
mode  will  respond  by  assessing  any  acts  by 
Gazprom  in  terms  of  compliance  or  non-
compliance  with  the  Union’s  antitrust  acquis. 
This  Martian  incomprehension  and  fury, 
                                                   
66 With apologies to Professor Robert Kagan and his 
work, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the 
New  World  Order,  New  York,  NY:  Random  House, 
2003. 
responded  to  with  Venusian  legality  and 
evidence-based  procedure  is  not  likely  to  end 
well or assist EU-Russian relations in the short 
term. 
If this latter scenario comes to fruition, Moscow 
should  understand  that  threats  of  serious  or 
actual disturbance to gas supplies to the member 
states  will  be  self-defeating.  Faced  with  threats 
from  Moscow,  the  member  states  will  indeed 
start  drilling  for  shale  gas  at  scale;  the  US 
Congress will permit large-scale exports of shale 
gas to permit LNG ‘freedom carriers’ to arrive in 
Europe;  the  32  planned  LNG  gasification 
terminals will move rapidly to final investment 
decisions and offshore exploration in the Eastern 
Mediterranean  will  proceed  at  speed.  The 
Kremlin  in  the  years  after  2012  may  finally 
achieve  President  Ronald  Reagan’s  goal  of 
reducing Russian gas to the supply of last resort, 
while  at  the  same  time  all  but  eliminating 
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